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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The changes that are taking place in the structure of the population of many Western 
countries are likely to require considerable adjustments in their social security programs. 
A partial shift from pay-as-you-go (P  AYG) to funding is one of the solutions frequently 
considered.1 A larger reliance on funded pension schemes may contribute to moderating 
the effects of population ageing in two ways.  First of all,  the development of pension 
funds may offset the negative effects that the reduction of  public pensions would exert on 
the income of retired citizens.  It may therefore facilitate the reform of P  A  YG schemes 
and the reduction of the strain exerted by ageing on public finances.  Secondly,  a shift 
from P  A  YG to funding may offset the negative effects that ageing is likely to generate on 
the private saving ratio. 
These  proposals  have  been  extensively  examined,  and  are  still  in  many  ways 
controversial.  2 There is no consensus neither on the optimal relative dimension of  P  A  YG 
and funded schemes, nor on the actual need for additional savings,  and on the scale of 
the effects of  pension reforms on savings. 3 
The tax treatment of supplementary funded pension schemes represents one of the main 
focus points of  policy discussion. It is widely recognized that tax rules influence the way 
retirement  savings  are  channeled  and  the  charecteristics  of funded  pension  systems.  4 
They determine the dimension of  funded schemes, their legal structure, their investment 
mix.  They also influence the types of benefits paid by the schemes.  Tax incentives have 
often been claimed as necessary for the development of  supplementary funded schemes. 
This paper, without entering into the P  A  YG versus funding argument, into the matter of 
the adequacy of  saving levels, or into the definition of  the general tax treatment of  saving 
with respect to consumption, focuses on the budgetary implications of  the tax treatment 
of funded  schemes.  In  particular,  it  examines  two  related  topics:  the  opportunity  of 
providing advantageous tax incentives to funded pension schemes vis-a-vis other forms 
of saving,  and  the effects of different tax arrangements on budgetary outcomes.  More 
specifically,  by surveying the economic literature on the taxation of pension funds,  the 
paper tries to assert two points: 
a)  There are limited reasons to provide a favourable fiscal treatment to supplementary 
funded pension schemes. In particular, there are no reasons concerning the level of 
savings. The shift from P  A  YG to funding is likely to increase private savings even 
if no  special  advantage  is  granted  to  funded  schemes.  Fiscal  incentives,  by 
2 
3 
4 
OECD  (1987); Hageman and Nicoletti (1989);  Brittain (1992);  World Bank (1994);  Holzmann (1996); 
Davis (1996a). 
See Aaron (1992), Duskin (1992), Pesando (1992); Munnel (1992); Schmahl (1992); Davis (1994); Disney 
(1996). 
On the effects of  the pension reform implemented in Chile in  the 1980s see Holzmann (1996). 
Davis (1993, 1994). -4-
worsening public accounts,  might actually reduce total savings.  Incentives should 
be provided only where pension funds  are considered to play a specific  positive 
role in the capital or in the labour market, or in the provision of  retirement income. 
This is  likely to occur only in situations in which the financial markets are rather 
underdeveloped or in which there are no compulsory P  A  YG pension schemes. 
b)  Contrary  to  some  recent  proposals  and  to  the  reforms  implemented  in  some 
countries,  tax  arrangements  should  not  shift  revenues  from  the  future  to  the 
present. In other words, the budgetary effects of special tax incentives for pension 
schemes and,  more generally,  of expenditure-based forms  of taxation,  should  be 
borne immediately.  This would avoid  a worsening of deficits in the future,  when 
demographic factors will exert a greater pressure on public expenditure. It would 
also provide a clearer view of  the budgetary cost of  fiscal incentives. 
Section 2 provides a general framework for examining the tax regimes of pension funds. 
Section 3 examines the opportunity of  providing tax incentives to pension funds.  Section 
4 addresses the inter-temporal implications of  different tax regimes. 
2.  ALTERNATIVE TAX REGIMES FOR PENSION FUNDS5 
Funded pension schemes can be taxed at three points of  their activity: 
a)  When contributions are paid into the fund. 6 
b)  When investment income is earned by the fund. 
c)  When pensions are paid from the accumulated fund. 
Before examining the different tax regimes,  it may be useful to refer briefly to the two 
alternative (and polar) models of  personal income taxation that are usually considered as 
terms of  reference in the analysis of  the tax treatment of savings and capital income: the 
comprehensive income tax (CIT) and the expenditure tax (ET).7 
A CIT aims  at taxing all  forms  of income equally.  Income is usually defined in a very 
broad  sense,  that includes  capital  gains.  According  to  a widely  quoted  definition  by 
Simon (1938),  income is  "the algebraic  sum of 1)  market value  of rights  exercised in 
consumption and 2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the 
beginning and the end of  the period in question".  8 
5 
6 
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8 
This Section draws largely from works carried out within the Institute for  Fiscal Studies of London.  See 
Dilnot (1992) and Johnson (1992). 
This phase concerns the tax treatment of  income devoted to pension funds by employees and employers; i.e., 
whether contributions are  exempted from the personal income  tax and  social  security  contributions  and 
whether employees' contributions can be deducted in the assessment of  company profits. 
The CIT and the ET are thoroughly examined in Meade (1978). See also Capital Taxes Group (1989). 
The CIT tax base is therefore -5-
An ET  taxes  consumption  expenditure.  Savings  are  exempted,  while  dissavings  are 
taxed. Therefore,  "the expenditure tax imposes an effective zero tax rate on the returns 
to savings in all forms ... the government is effectively a 'sleeping partner' in every act of 
saving and does not decrease the return to the saver. "9  More specifically,  "the post-tax 
return to the investor on any asset is identical to the pre-tax return: the set of  investments 
that are privately worthwhile in the presence of the tax is exactly the set that would be 
worthwhile if  there were no tax at all." 10 
The deduction of  savings from taxation can be achieved in two ways. 
a)  Allowing  a  deduction  from  income  equal  to  the  amount  of new  savings;  this 
method has been defined as a "registered-assets expenditure tax (RET),  1111  since it 
would require the designation of a certain number of registered assets, for which 
the deduction would be available. 
b)  Exempting the return of savings.  This has been called a "pre-paid expenditure tax 
(PET)".12 
In some conditions (in particular if labour income and  asset/pension income are subject 
to  the  same  tax  rate),  the  two  methodologies  are  equivalent13•  This  means  that  the 
consumption tax is basically a tax on labour income. 
The advantages and disadvantages of  CIT and ET have been extensively examined in the 
economic literature.  14 As a matter of  fact, most western fiscal systems include both CIT 
and ET features. Here it is relevant to note that CIT and ET "represent two alternative 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
where  Ct  = conswnption in period t (including the the rental value of  services from durable goods) 
11 Wt  = change in real net wealth. 
Capital Taxes Group (1989, p. 17). 
Keen (1991 ), p. 56. 
Keen (1991). 
In this case a problem may arise concerning the distinction between capital and labour income. 
If  the tax rate on labour income (fw) is equal to the tax rate on pension income(~),  the RET pension 
Pret = (wl - c1) * (1 + rf  *(1  -~)is  equal to the PET pension P  pet= (wl - cl) * (1  - fw) * (1 + rf. 
Where  wl  = labour income in period 1 
c1  = consumption in period 1 
r  = rate of  return on assets. 
See Robinson (1990). The two types of tax schemes obviously raise different implementation problems. As 
noted in OECD (1994 ), another major difference concerns the effects of  anticipated changes in the tax rates. 
While they can  substantially affect  saving  decisions in a RET  system,  they are not relevant in a PET 
system. 
Among the most recent studies see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Pechman (1990), Keen (1991 ). -6-
ways of  interpreting fiscal neutrality in relation to the decision to save. "15  The former is 
neutral between consumption and saving, since it taxes income without regard to the way 
it is used. The latter is neutral between present and future consumption.  16 Both taxes are 
neutral with respect to the allocation of savings in the case of unintermediated savings. 
As  to  intermediated  savings,  neutrality  in  the  CIT  case  requires  the  imputation  of 
corporate income  to  individuals;  in  the  ET  case  it requires  an  effective  tax  rate  on 
intermediaries  and  investors  equal  to  zero. 17  In  principle,  both  taxes  may  achieve 
horizontal  and  vertical  equity  objectives.  Both  taxes  face  relevant  administrative 
problems,  although the CIT seems to fare worse in this area. 18  On the other hand,  the 
transition from CIT to ET would be burdensome, since it would be necessary to identify 
consumption from previously taxed assets. 
If the CIT is the term of reference,  there is  nothing inequitable in taxing both income 
devoted  to saving  and  income  earned  from  assets.  Anything  less  would  represent  a 
favourable  treatment.  On  the  other  hand,  if consumption  is  the  term  of reference, 
taxation has to occur in a single phase. Anything more would represent an unfavourable 
treatment. 
Coming to pension funds,  a CIT would require the taxation of  income in phase 'a' (when 
contributions are paid into the fund)  and in either phase 'b'  (when investment income is 
earned by the fund)  or phase 'c'  (when pensions are paid from the accumulated fund). 
Denoting withE (for Exemption) or T (for Taxation) the fact that taxation occurs in one 
of the  three  different  stages,  the  following  models  would  be  consistent  with  a  CIT 
approach: TET, TTE. An ET would require the taxation of  income in phase 'c' (the RET 
method) or,  alternatively, in phase 'a'  (the PET method). 19  EET or TEE models would 
have to be used. 
Although within western countries there are examples of  regimes "which tax pensions at 
almost  every  conceivable combination of these points",20  the EET regime is  the  most 
widespread. As will be shown in Section 4, this situation seems to be changing gradually. 
15 
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Johnson (I992, p. 134). 
Without any tax, the ratio between present and future consumption is 1 I (1 + r). 
With an expenditure tax, present consumption is wi * (1  - t), and future consumption is wi * (1  - t) * (1  + 
r). The ratio of  the two is still I I (I + r). 
With a CIT, present consumption is wi * (I - t) and future consumption is wi * (1  - t) * (1  + r * (1  - t)). 
The ratio of  the two is now I I (I + r *  (I - t)). 
See Capital Taxes Group  (1989). 
It raises, for instance, severe problemes of inflation adjustment and capital gains accounting.  See Dilnot 
(1992). 
See the above note concerning the equivalence between RET and PET. 
Dilnot (1992, p. 63). -7-
3.  SHOULD TAX-INCENTIVES BE PROVIDED TO PENSION FUNDS? 
This  section examines the main arguments that are usually put forward  for  providing 
fiscal incentives to pension funds,  namely to raise the level of savings  and  to channel 
saving flows  through pension funds  rather than through other saving instruments.  The 
analysis is based on the view that a neutral tax system, by minimizing the effects of  taxes 
on the behaviour of economic agents, may raise revenues with the least distortion in the 
allocation of resources  and  with the least horizontal inequities.  21  Any  deviation from 
neutrality in the taxation of savings  should  therefore be justified in terms of relevant 
economic  or social  objectives  that  cannot  be  achieved  with  other  less  distortionary 
means. 
The arguments put forward for favourable tax treatment of pension funds largely apply 
to the special  saving  schemes  aimed  at encouraging household  saving  that have been 
introduced in several countries. These schemes have often been granted tax rules similar 
to those applying to pension funds. 22 
It should be stressed that the following  analysis  does not aim to question the fact that 
pension funds  "are worthy and  valuable organisations which serve an important social 
purpose. The relevant question is whether they have worth and value which implies that 
they should receive fiscal privilege additional to, and at the expense of,  activities which 
are also worthy and valuable. "23 
3.1  The level of savings 
Neither  theoretical  analysis  nor  empirical  investigation  support  the  vtew  that  tax 
incentives produce unambiguous positive effects on the level of  savings. 
The theoretical argument is based on the opposite income and substitution effects of any 
increase in the after-tax rate of  return of  private savings. The former effect may induce a 
reduction in savings because the individual needs less of it to maintain future  post-tax 
income; the latter is likely to increase it by raising its net return.  24 
If  the change in the after-tax return does not apply to all types of saving, the net effect is 
even  more  difficult  to  determine.  As  Engen  et  al.  (1994,  p.86)  point  out,  "Saving 
incentive programs that raise the after-tax return on limited amounts of assets placed in 
designated accounts may be an even less effective way to stimulate private savings than 
increasing the rate of return on all saving.  This is because a household does not need to 
reduce consumption or to raise  labor supply to  claim  the tax advantages of a  saving 
21  See Capital Taxes Group (1989), OECD (1994). 
22  See OECD (1994  ). 
23  Fry et al.  (1985, p. 20). 
24  See Leape (1990). (2) 
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incentive.  Instead,  the  contributions  may  be  financed  by  transferring  existing  taxable 
assets, by increasing debt,  or by reallocating current saving that would have been done 
anyway." 
More specifically, for workers with a desired level of saving exceeding that provided by 
the pension plan,  there is  no  substitution effect;  the income effect is  therefore likely to 
determine a reduction in saving.  Tax incentives may be particularly inefficient where, for 
budgetary  or distributive  reasons,  contributions  to  pension  schemes  are  subject  to  a 
ceiling.  If the  ceiling  is  lower  than the  total  amount  of saving  desired  by  a  certain 
individual, the scheme has no effect on the marginal rate of  return of saving.  It generates 
only an income effect. 
On the other hand,  workers with a low desired level of saving may be forced  to save 
more than they would have done otherwise.  The illiquidity of pension entitlements may 
prevent  them  from  reducing  other  forms  of saving  in  order  to  compensate  for  the 
increase in pension savings.  On balance,  tax incentives for  pension schemes lead to an 
increase in private saving when pension rights exceed the amount of saving that workers 
would have done on their own and lead to a reduction in private saving when pension 
rights are less than workers' desired level of  saving.  25 
Taking the reduction in tax revenues into  account,  that determines  a decline in public 
sector saving,  the effects of tax incentives on national saving may be either positive or 
negative. 
On the empirical side, despite extended investigation, there is no agreement on the actual 
effects of existing tax incentives. While many studies have suggested that tax incentives 
increase private saving and determine a small increase in national  saving,  26  others have 
found no significant positive effect on national saving. 
Engen et a/.  (1994), while examining the main saving incentive plans experimented with 
in the United States (IR.As and 401(k) plans), note that:  "it is difficult to conclude from 
the  aggregate  data that  changes  in  saving  incentives  were  an  important influence  on 
saving  behavior in  the  1980s"  (p.  96).  They  also  show that  survey  data reveal  little 
evidence of positive effects on private savings.  "After accounting for the decline in tax 
revenues,  the estimates imply little, if any,  positive effect on national saving."  (p.  150) 
The same view is  held  by  Burman eta/. (1990).  They note (p.  279) that "IR.As  were 
most  attractive  to  taxpayers  with  higher  incomes  who  liked  to  save  and  most 
contributions  were  made  at  the  limit  amount  year  after  year"  and  that  "universal 
availability of IR.As reduced net national savings because private savings increased (if at 
all)  by  only  a  fraction  of the  amount  of individuals'  tax  reductions."  Attanasio  and 
DeLeire (1994) have found  "evidence that supports the view that households financed 
25 
26 
This topic is extensively examined in Munnell (1982). 
See Dilnot (I  992) and, among the most recent empirical studies, Poterba, Venti and Wise (1993), Venti and 
Wise  (1994)  and Feldstein  (1995).  Poterba,  Venti  and Wise  (1995)  point to  "very  little  substitution" 
between saving in special American saving accounts and other forms of  personal saving. According to them, 
most contributions to these accounts represent additional saving. -9-
their IRA contributions primarily through reductions in their stocks of  other assets"; less 
than 20 per cent of  IRA contributions were found to represent additional saving. 
As  to the preferential treatment of pensions,  according to Munnel (1992,  p.  18),  "the 
most reasonable conclusion is  that the increase in private  saving  may  well  have  been 
completely offset by a comparable increase in the federal deficit, leaving national saving 
unchanged". Along the same lines, Bernheim and Scholz (1992, p.  21), in examining the 
effects  of tax incentives  for  retirement  income  in  the  United  States,  argue  that  "the 
current system is quite effective at providing pensions to those who reduce other saving 
in response, but is  substantially less effective at providing coverage to those individuals 
for whom pensions would represent additional saving." 
OECD (1994, p.  42) concludes a survey of Canadian, U.S.  and Japanese experience by 
stating  that  "there  is  no  consensus  over  whether  a  higher  rate  of return  of saving 
increases saving in aggregate or reduces it, although in the case of  particular tax schemes 
aimed at encouraging saving (especially for retirement), if total household saving has in 
fact  increased,  this  may  be  due  to  factors  such  as  advertising  and  increased  public 
awareness rather than the effects of  tax concessions on the rate of  return. "27 
3.2  The composition of savings 
The second argument that is usually put forward to justify a favourable fiscal treatment 
for pension funds  concerns some positive effects that may  be  achieved  by  channeling 
savings through pension funds rather than through other saving instruments. 
Three issues will be considered in tum: the effects of pension funds on the provision of 
resources for old-age, on capital markets, and on the labour market. 
Let us first note that saving flows are very sensitive to tax incentives. Leape ( 1990) notes 
that in 1987 tax-privileged assets attracted about three-quarters of  the total flow of UK 
savings.  According  to  Engen  et  al.  (1994)  since  1986  contributions  to  specially 
designated savings accounts have amounted to about one third of personal saving in the 
United States. The relevance of  the effects of  tax rates on the composition of savings is 
stressed  by  OECD  (1994),  that  surveys  several  econometric  studies  that  have  used 
micro-data sets on individual households. 
3 .2.1  The provision of adequate resources for retirement -- People obviously save for a 
variety  of reasons,  but  society  may  be  particularly  interested  in  the  level  of their 
retirement  saving.  In  fact,  the  lack  of adequate  resources  for  old  age  may  increase 
poverty  or,  alternatively,  may  require  society  to  provide  welfare  benefits.  As  Dilnot 
(1992, p.  69) points out, "individuals may not predict accurately their likely needs in old 
age,  and it can be argued that this failure of perception or information is more serious 
27  The same view is expressed by Skinner (1991) with regard to the introduction of Individual Retirement 
Accounts in the United States. -10-
here than in other areas."  Governments should therefore "distort choices using the tax 
system in an attempt to correct the deficiencies of  individual preferences. "28 
If  pension funds are considered more effective than other saving instruments in providing 
retirement income (because they increase the amount of saving of low income citizens, 
and because of  the illiquidity of  pension rights, that cannot be decumulated at will), it can 
therefore  be  argued  that tax incentives  are justified  on the grounds  of their  positive 
effects on poverty and public expenditure.  29 
Two objections can be raised to this argument. 
a)  Tax incentives, by themselves, do not ensure that all workers (or all citizens) have 
an adequate retirement income.  Bernheim and  Scholz {1992)  estimate that in the 
United  States  tax incentives  fail  to  stimulate  additional  saving  by  low  income 
households mainly  because of their lack  of perception of future  needs.  Munnel 
(1992, p.  17) notes that in the United States "less than one-half of  the population is 
covered  by  a  supplementary  employer-sponsored  plan,  coverage  tends  to  be 
concentrated among the higher paid, and the percentage of  even the full-time work 
force covered by a traditional pension plan is declining. Thus, the tax incentives do 
not appear to be meeting the goal of providing supplementary pension income to 
those who would not save on their own, and are unlikely to do so in the future". 
Funded or unfunded pension schemes can ensure adequate income to all workers 
only if enrolment is compulsory, but once enrolment is compulsory, tax incentives 
are no longer necessary. 
b)  If the public sector is  providing a compulsory P  A  YG pension or a tax financed 
universal basic pension that ensures a minimum income to all retired citizens, as is 
the case in most Western countries, it is not necessary to provide tax incentives to 
supplementary  funded  pension  schemes.  People's  saving  decisions  may  be 
considered  sufficient  or insufficient  as  to  the  total  amount  of saving,  but  this 
requires  some  action  regarding  all  saving  decisions,  not just those  concerning 
retirement saving and,  even more specifically,  those concerning funds  accruing to 
pension schemes. 
28 
29 
30 
Some distributional considerations also suggest to avoid providing tax subsidies to 
pension  funds  as  the  value  of tax  incentives  usually  increases  with  taxpayers' 
marginal rates.  Furthermore,  in many  countries  supplementary pension  coverage 
tends to be concentrated among the better paid workers.  30 
See also Blake (1991). 
This view is clearly expressed by Davis (1993, p.  44), who suggests, on this ground,  "that pension funds 
should be tax advantaged even if  other forms of  savings are not." Conversely, as noted in Lindbeck (1994, p. 
21): "Governments in some countries (including Denmark and Sweden) have, in fact, confiscated portions of 
private insurance capital by special tax levies in situations when politicians believed that the returns on the 
funds had been 'too high' for a while." 
This topic is extensively examined in Pestieau (1992). - 11-
3 .2.2 Capital markets -- Two positive  effects  of pension funds  are being  put forward 
with regard to capital markets.  31  The first refers to the increased demand for long-term 
instruments,  32 the second to the institutionalization of  asset management. 
The first effect is related to the peculiar characteristics of pension funds,  as opposed to 
those of  other asset managers. 
a)  Inflows and outflows of  funds are rather stable and predictable. 
b)  Liabilities are non-tradable, which means that there are lower withdrawal risks.  33 
c)  The return on investment can be maximized with a long term perspective. 
These features imply that the portfolio share of liquid assets can be small,  while that of 
bonds and equities can be relatively high. 34 If  a high demand for bonds and equities exerts 
positive effects on investment and growth, by providing more risk-capital to firms and by 
reducing  long-term  interest  rates,  there  may  be  a  case  for  providing  incentives  for 
channeling savings into pension funds. 35  More specifically,  starting from the observation 
that "countries with large pension funds tend to have well-developed securities markets, 
while others (Germany, Italy) do not", Davis (1993, p.  39) suggests that "pension funds 
should be particularly beneficial to development of equity markets."  He adds that this 
development "is  seen as beneficial in providing risk  capital for growing enterprises,  as 
well as offsetting the potential fragility and/  or dependence on bank finance which stems 
from high debt/  equity ratios." 
Without entering into the matter of the benefits arising from a higher demand for bonds 
and equities, some considerations may oppose the provision of  special fiscal incentives to 
pension funds.  First of all,  individuals may react to the increase in the demand for long-
term assets by pension funds by decreasing their direct holdings of such assets.  The net 
effect may  therefore be rather limited  and  uncertain.  36  Moreover,  if there is  a lack of 
demand  for  long-term  financial  instruments,  it  would  probably  be  more  efficient  to 
provide a direct incentive for holding  them,  rather then an indirect one by  promoting 
pension funds.  A direct incentive (for instance an abatement of  the tax rate on dividends 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See Mare (1989), Pace (1990), Busana (1993) and Davis (1996b). 
Davis (1994, p. 5), for instance, notes that "fimding can also benefit the capital markets via the composition 
of saving (in long term instruments such as equities and bonds)." 
Pension portability presents some risks for  the individual fimd,  but does not affect total investments  in 
pension fimds. 
See Davis (1996a). The effects of population ageing on the composition of pension funds' assets should be 
carefully examined. If ageing were to determine some divestment of assets, pension fimds  might increase 
the share of liquid assets.  On the effects of the muturity of pension schemes on investment decisions see 
Davis (1994 ). 
This view is clearly expressed in Blake ( 1991 ). 
See Munnel ( 1982) and Pesando ( 1992 ). - 12-
or on long-term bond interest) would avoid the deadweight cost involved in subsidizing 
pension funds' demand for all assets. 
The  second  positive  effect  of pension  funds  in  the  financial  markets  regards  their 
contribution in concentrating asset management in  large institutions.  Collective  saving 
management may  be  superior to individual  management  because  of the  economies  of 
scale in transaction costs,  in collecting and  managing information,  in risk-pooling. 37  It 
may also "serve as a catalyst to financial innovation. "38 According to Davis (1993, p.  42), 
in Western countries pension funds "have stimulated innovation, promoted liquid market 
structure, boosted the demand for capital market instruments (by increasing saving)  as 
well  as  making  demand  more  sensitive  to  return  and  risk,  and  aided  the  broader 
development of  capital markets. "39 The institutionalisation of  asset management may also 
produce positive effects on corporate governance, by putting more pressure on firms to 
focus  on  return  on  equity  and  provide  more  and  better  quality  information  to 
shareholders.  Moreover,  institutional investors  can better monitor the  performance  of 
firms and be more effective in removing underperforming managers. 
The fact that institutional investors exert a beneficial role  does  not justify  special  tax 
incentives  for  pension funds, 40  since  it is  not evident  that the  latter produce positive 
effects  that other institutions  do  not  deliver.  The  case for  providing  incentives  to  all 
institutional investors is also not very strong. If institutional investors are more efficient 
than individuals in saving management,  they should play a large role even without tax 
incentives.  41  There  might  be  a  reason  to  provide  incentives  only  where  the  financial 
markets are rather underdeveloped and there is a need to accelerate the development of 
institutional investors. 
The actual behavior of  pension funds has also shown some drawbacks. United States and 
United Kingdom pension funds have been accused of "short-termism", of  being unwilling 
to invest in small companies and in new high-risk ventures, of having increased capital 
market volatility.42 
Some other objections regard specifically the granting of  incentives to pension funds.  As 
the  Capital  Taxes  Group  (1989,  p.  38)  notes,  "It  also  seems  highly  likely  -- though 
concrete evidence is hard to come by -- that the tax privilege accorded to pension funds 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
See the extensive analysis of  Davis (1996b). 
Pesando (1992), p.  131. 
See also Blake (1991) and Bodie (1991). 
A different view is expressed in Ghilarducci (1994). Since "Private pensions embody public subsidies" and 
"Pension funds are, in large part, creatures of the tax code"  (p.  10), public policy should shape pension 
regulation in order to "systematically encourage pension funds to pursue long-term, economically productive 
investment strategies in the course of  normal, everyday management" (p.  9). 
In recent years the role of institutional investors has actually increased in many Western countries (Davis 
1996b) without an evident increase in tax incentives. 
See Blake (1991 ), Davis (1993) and Ghilarducci (1994  ). -13-
and  life  assurance  companies  breeds  inefficiency:  the  tax  advantages  are  such  as  to 
insulate the savings institutions from  competitive forces  which would  otherwise force 
them to keep costs at the minimum". 43 
Finally, while the capital market benefits of a favourable tax treatment of pension funds 
are uncertain,  fiscal incentives are likely to create distortions.  According to the Capital 
Taxes Group (1989, p.  37),  "the link between effective tax rates and  distortions to the 
pattern of saving has been clearly established. The consequences of  this are apparent for 
the structure of the retail financial  service industry, where the vast majority of savings 
vehicles are sold primarily on relative merits of their treatment by the tax system.  The 
profitability  of the  underlying  investments  is  often  of secondary  importance,  to  the 
obvious detriment of the ability of the capital markets to channel savings into the most 
efficient investments." 
3.2.3 The labour market -- Private pension schemes  can be  used by firms  to regulate 
labour turnover. A variety of  objectives can be actually pursued.44 
a)  Defined benefit schemes with a vesting45 period or with progressive benefit accrual 
allow firms to pay workers less than their marginal product in the first part of  their 
career and  more in a second  stage.  This profile reduces turnover,  and  therefore 
hiring  and  training  costs.  It also  allow  firms  to  invest  more  funds  in workers' 
training.  As a result, for example,  in the United States "job  mobility and pension 
coverage  are  highly  correlated,  with  tenure  on the job  considerably  longer  for 
workers participating in pension plans" (OECD, 1993b, p. 74). 
b)  Defined benefit schemes, by increasing the cost of  being laid off,  may also increase 
work effort and reduce shirking (and monitoring costs). 
c)  Company schemes may  also  be used  to encourage  employees  to  leave  the firm 
when there is excessive employment or a need to rejuvenate manpower. 
Since  companies  should  be  expected  to  pay  for  advantages  accruing  to  them,  these 
objectives would justify a favourable tax treatment for funded schemes only where there 
were benefits  external to the mother-companies of the pension funds.  This  cannot be 
taken for granted. The increase in flexibility achieved by an individual company may even 
determine negative effects for the whole economy. 
a)  Vesting rules and non neutral accrual of  pension rights may reduce labour mobility. 
43 
44 
45 
Furthermore, in defined benefit schemes,  if the contribution rate is  constant over 
the  different  ages  of the  workers,  while  salaries  increase  with age,  there  is  an 
According to Blake (1991 ), some distortions might also arise from the incentives provided against the direct 
holding of shares by individuals, since individuals and pension funds may have different views about the 
activities of  the companies whose shares they own. 
See Lazear (1989), Arvin (1991) and the survey provided in Busana (1993). 
"Vesting refers to the provision that an employee covered by  a private pension plan will, after meeting 
certain requirements, retain a right to the benefits he has accrued even though his service with the employer 
terminates before retirement." (Munnell, 1982, p. 34 ). - 14-
incentive to stay with the same firm since all past contributions would be upgraded 
to the final salary.  46 
b)  When workers are encouraged to take early retirement, there may also be negative 
effects on labour supply and on public finance accounts. 
3.3  Some conclusions 
The studies surveyed in the previous sections allow a clear conclusion: there is no clear 
cut evidence to justify a favourable fiscal  treatment for pension funds  as  compared to 
other forms  of saving.  While  the benefits of fiscal  incentives are rather uncertain,  the 
unbalanced  distribution  of the  benefits  and  the  distortions  raised  by  them  suggest 
reducing tax incentives vis-a-vis other forms of  saving as much as possible. 
In particular, there are no clear-cut reasons concerning the level of savings. Any increase 
in private saving  that fiscal  incentives to pension funds  might produce is  likely  to be 
offset by the decline in public saving due to tax cuts. Moreover, the shift from PAYG to 
funding that will be prompted by the cuts in public pensions is likely to increase private 
savings even if  no special advantage is granted to funded schemes. 
Incentives should be provided only where pension funds are considered to play a specific 
positive role in the provision of  retirement income47 or in the capital market. This is likely 
to occur only in situations in which there are no compulsory pension schemes or in which 
the financial  markets  are  rather undeveloped.  In the latter case,  incentives  should  be 
provided on a temporary basis. 
Whether existing  fiscal  privileges  of pensions  funds  should  be  removed  by  "levelling 
down"  or by  "levelling up"  (i.e.,  respectively,  by treating pension funds  as  other non 
privileged forms of saving or by treating all forms of saving as privileged pension funds) 
is bejond the purpose of  this paper. This leads to the fundamental choice of  a CIT versus 
anET.48 
46 
47 
48 
Many  governments  have  introduced  regulations  aimed  at  limiting  these  negative  aspects.  See  Altman 
(1992). 
In this case fiscal incentives should be provided only to benefits paid out periodically (i.e., to pensions) . 
The widespread practise of allowing a more lenient fiscal treament to lump sum payment at retirement is 
inconsistent with the objective of ensuring adequate means through all the retirement period.  See Altman 
(1992). 
See Chapter 12 in Fry et al. (1985). -15-
4.  TAX OPTIONS AND BUDGETARY OUTCOMES 
Several recent studies have provided a useful framework for understanding the options 
available for the taxation of pension funds.  They have highlighted their consistency with 
the  different  concepts of tax neutrality,  their  equity  implications,  their  administrative 
requirements.  One relevant aspect has been rather neglected.49  It regards the different 
constrains that tax regimes pose for the public sector at various points of time. Namely, 
while TEE regimes raise present revenues and reduce future ones, EET regimes work the 
opposite way, shifting revenues towards the future. 
The first part of this section will briefly review some recent developments in legislation 
and  in  the  policy  debate.  The  second  part  will  provide  a  simple  framework  for 
understanding the issue. The third will focus on the contrast between these developments 
and the budgetary perspectives of  many Western countries. 
4.1  Recent developments 
While the EET regimes have long been the most widespread, in recent years there has 
been a tendency towards the introduction of  TEE or TTE regimes. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
49 
50 
51 
52 
In  1990 New Zealand  shifted  the tax treatment of pension funds  from EET to 
TTE.  5°  From that year employers' contributions are subject to a withholding tax of 
3  3 per cent, employees' contributions are non-deductible, investment earnings are 
taxed at 33 per cent (without adjustments to account for inflation), and pensions or 
lump-sum  payments  are  tax-free.  The  reform  aimed  at achieving  tax  neutrality 
between different types of saving and capital income and  at increasing revenues. 
According  to  Stephens  (1993,  p.  54),  "The  real  reason was  a  desire  to  bring 
forward tax revenue for budget deficit purposes." 
In the late eighties Australia shifted from EET to TTT.  51  Contributions, previously 
untaxed,  are  taxed  at  15  per  cent;  the  tax is  levied  on  the  fund.  Investment 
earnings, net of  expenses and with capital gains adjusted for inflation, are taxed at 
15  per cent. To offset the tax on contributions, taxes on benefits were reduced by 
15 percentage points. 
In the United Kingdom,  the  1986 Budget introduced the Personal Equity Plans 
(PEPs) in order to increase direct investment in equities of  UK companies listed on 
the  Stock Exchange.  52  In these  plans,  within  a  certain  annual  limit,  assets  are 
With the relevant exception ofBovenberg and Petersen (1992). 
The reform is extensively examined in OECD (1993a). See also Stephens (1993). 
See Dilnot (1992) and Munnell (1992). 
See Capital Taxes Group (1989). -16-
purchased  out of taxed  income.  The  returns  on the  assets  (dividends,  interest, 
capital  gains)  are  exempt  from  tax  (TEE).  A  new  type  of tax-exempt  saving 
account (Tax-Exempt Special Savings Account- TESSA) was introduced in the 
following years.  It allows bank and  building  society deposits to be tax-exempt if 
held in the account for at least five years. 
d)  When  legislation  concerning  funded  supplementary  pension  schemes  was 
introduced in Italy in  1992,  contributions to funded  schemes were subjected to a 
15  per  cent  withholding  tax. 53  Tax  credits  proportional  to  the  tax  levied  on 
contributions were granted on future pensions.  54  This  scheme,  which would have 
actually  represented  a  form  of compulsory  acquisition  of special  public  bonds, 
aimed at ensuring that the development of funded  pension schemes determined a 
net increase in revenues for a considerable period (  CER 1993).  The scheme was 
abolished in 199 5. 
Theoretical work has  argued along the same lines.  In  1989  The  Capital Taxes  Group 
formed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies in London suggested a considerable extension 
of the Personal Equity Plans.  The aim  of the new  plan  (named  EXPEP) was that of 
reducing tax induced distortions in the allocation of  personal saving by taking all returns 
out of tax (as those on pensions and housing already are).  The plan would also remove 
the problems caused by inflation and by capital gains evaluation that are inherent to any 
tax on saving return. For equity reasons there would be an annual limit on contributions 
to the fund.  As to the budgetary effects, the Capital Income Group noted (p.  4) that "An 
EXPEP has far lower start up costs for the government than an ET, since the tax loss is 
only that which would be paid on returns. Under an ET there is a loss of revenue at the 
time of  saving". 
In the United  States, the substitution of the  "deductible IRA"  (based  on EET criteria) 
with a  "backloaded IRA"  (based on the TEE criteria) has  been frequently  considered. 
According to Burman et a/.  (1990), the latter type of IRA is  "politically more attractive 
because it seems to offer a way of introducing a saving incentive without at the same 
time raising the federal deficit." 
Munnell  (1992)  has  proposed to  change the United  States  pension fund  system from 
EET to TTE. According to Munnell (p.  19), the present treatment "costs a lot in forgone 
revenues,  creates  horizontal  inequities,  and  does  nothing  to  increase  saving."  It  is 
therefore advisable to move towards a CIT and  to include in  each taxpayer's base the 
change in the present discounted value of future retirement benefits.  This objective can 
be approximated by taxing both contributions on pension funds and earnings on pension 
fund assets. A flat rate of 15 per cent could be applied, with rebates on pension benefits 
for low income earners and surcharges for high income earners.  In order to avoid that 
existing  assets  escape income tax,  Munnell  suggested  a one-time  assessment  of these 
53 
54 
See Ruggiero (1993). 
Tax credits were to be calculated on the basis of  the rate achieved by each pension fund on the remaining 85 
per cent of  the contributions paid to pension funds. -17-
assets. A  I5 per cent levy would raise one-time revenues amounting to I5 per cent of 
United States outstanding debt. 
4.2  Sources of budgetary imbalances 
In order to examine the budgetary effects of  these changes, let us consider a situation in 
which each citizen works in the first half of  his/her life and gets a pension in the second 
half Let us also assume that funded pension schemes are created in period I and reach 
maturity in period 2. 
Under a TEE system, in period I net contributions to funded schemes are 
pi= f* yi * (I-tw) 
In period 2, net contributions are 
p2 = f* yi * (I-tw) * (I+w) * (I+n) 
while net pensions are equal to 
Where: 
p2 = f* yi * (I-tw) * (I+r) 
f is the contribution rate to funded pension schemes 
Y is taxable income 
tw is the tax rate on wages 
tp is the tax rate on pensions 
w is the rate of  growth of  wages 
n is the rate of  growth of  the number of  workers 
r is the return on pension fund assets 
Under an EET system, 
pi=f*Yl 
p2 = f* yi * (I+w) * (I+n) 
p2 = f* yi * (I+r) * (I-tp) 
In period I, when funds are build up, tax revenues are respectively equal to 
TTEEI = tw * yi 
TEET I=  tw * yi *(I-f) 
In period 2 tax revenues are respectively equal to -18-
TTEE2 = tw * y2 = tw * y1 * (1+w) * (1+n) 
TEET2 = tw * y2 * (1-f) + tp *  p2 = tw * y1 * (1+w) * (1+n) * (1-f) + tp * f 
* y1 * (1+r) 
This simple model makes it clear that: 
a)  As already pointed out in Section 2,  if tw =  tp,  the two solutions are equivalent 
from the pensioners' point of  view; if  tw > tp, pensioners prefer EET. 
b)  During the period when funds are built up, EET determines a smaller income tax 
base than TEE. 
c)  When pension funds have matured, if tw =  tp, EET provides higher revenues than 
TEE if (1  + r) > ((1  + w) * (1  + n)).  If tw > tp (because of the different average 
incomes of  workers and pensioners), EET provtdes higher revenues than TEE if  tp 
* (1  + r) > tw * ((1  + w) *  (1  + n)).55 
d)  Any shift from EET to TEE determines a one-off increase in revenues.  56 
The choice of system of pension fund  taxation has relevant intertemporal implications 
that ought to be considered in the assessment of  fiscal sustainability. While under a TEE 
system the government gives up the possibility of taxing part of citizens' future income, 
under an EET system it acquires a share in the pension funds.  It actually acquires "an 
implicit tax claim on funded pension schemes, which can be computed as the product of 
the average income tax rate on pension benefits and the assets of pension funds. "57  This 
means that under EET a government is less vulnerable to increases in interest rates than 
it  appears  to be  on the basis  of the  conventional  public  debt.  58  If ( 1  +w)  * (  1  +n)  is 
significantly lower than (1+r) and tw is not much higher than tp,  an EET system also 
provides more revenues than a TEE system.  59 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
In order to evaluate the relevance of 1w '1>, one can consider that, if 
a) maturity is reached after 40 years, and 
b)(1 + r) I ((1 + w) *  (1 + n)) = 1.02, 
then:  TEE~>  TTEE2  if1w/1> <2.2. 
If  the shift from EET to TEE takes place in time 2, T2 = 1w * Y1 *  (1 + w) * (1 + n) + tn * f * y1 * (1 + r). 
The increase in revenue is equivalent to the tax on existing pension assets envisaged by Munnell (1992). 
This tax could allow a transition from EET to TEE with limited administrative burden. 
Bovenberg and Petersen (1992, p.  5). According to them, on the hypothesis that the average tax rate on 
supplementary pension benefits is 20 per cent, in 1989 the tax claim on pension fimds represented 16 per 
cent of  GDP in the Netherlands, 12 per cent in the United Kingdom, 9 per cent in the United States, and 4 
per cent in Japan. 
Bovenberg and Petersen (1992) note that an increase in interest rates tends to increase public revenues both 
where the windfall gain is used to pay higher pensions and where it is used to reduce contributions. In the 
latter case, the amount deducted from taxable income would be lower. 
See the note to point c. -19-
By shifting from EET to TEE a government obtains some one-off revenues and foregoes 
the  claims  on future  pensions.  In  evaluating  the  change,  two  elements  ought  to  be 
considered: the likely effects on budgetary stance and the difference between the rate of 
interest on public debt and the return on pension fund assets. If  the occasional increase in 
revenue  does  not  induce  the  government  to  relax  its  budgetary  stance,  the  change 
determines an improvement in budgetary perspectives where the interest on public bonds 
is higher than the return on pension fund assets. It determines a worsening of budgetary 
perspectives in the case where the government can borrow at a lower rate of  interest. 
4.3  Some conclusions 
The  choice  of the  tax  system  of pension  funds  should  be  examined  taking  the 
demographic and public finance perspectives of  Western countries into account. In most 
of these  countries  the  old-age  dependency  ratio  is  likely  to  increase  substantially, 
especially after the year 2010, when the baby-boom generation will  start retiring.  This 
means that coefficient 'n' might assume rather low or even negative values. Several recent 
studies have reported that demographic changes are likely to increase the share of social 
expenditure  on GDP  considerably in the  next  decades.  60  The  increase in  pension  and 
health expenditure should largely outweigh the benefits resulting from lower expenditure 
on education  and  children's  allowances.  This  expenditure  pressure would  occur in  a 
situation in which there is  no  significant scope for tax increases and  public deficits are 
already relevant as is the case in many countries. Generational accounting analyses have 
confirmed that in some countries there is a large imbalance between the fiscal treatment 
of present  and  future  generations  of citizens.  61  In  order  to  avoid  a  debt  explosion, 
massive adjustment in taxes or expenditure rules will have to be applied. 62 
In this scenario,  a shift from EET to TEE or a similar policy change63  might increase 
revenues in a first phase and might reduce them afterwards, when ageing will put more 
pressure on budgets. This effect will be magnified if the one-off revenues related to the 
shift are used by government to relax their fiscal  stance.  In some Western countries, it 
will also be magnified by the increase in contributions to funded pension schemes that is 
likely  to  occur  in  a  first  phase  because  of the  cuts  operated  on  the  public  P  A  YG 
pensions. 
As Bovenberg and Petersen (1992, p.12) point out, an EET tax "seems to provide better 
insurance against the unexpected shocks in an ageing society with mature pension funds 
because the government has a broader tax base at its disposal."  Furthermore, since the 
EET is likely to require smaller changes in tax rates than the TEE, it "may reduce the 
deadweight losses and uncertainties associated with the tax system." 
60  Heller, Hemming and Kohert (1986), OECD (1988), Leibfritz et al. (1995), Franco and Munzi (1996). 
61  See Office of  Management and Budget (1994), Auerbach et al. (1993), Franco et al.  (1994). 
62  See Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989). 
63  Like the introduction of  a witholding tax on contributions, and of  a related tax credit. -20-
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